2025 INSC 929                                                            REPORTABLE

                                      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _________OF 2025
                            SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. __________ OF 2025
                               (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) (D) No.(s) 26453 OF 2025


            DEEPAK KUMAR SAHU                                           ….Appellant(s)
                                                   VERSUS
            STATE OF CHHATTISGARH                                     ….Respondent(s)


                                                 JUDGMENT

Delay condoned. Leave granted.

2. Preferred by the appellant-accused, the present appeal addresses the challenge to judgment and order 22nd September, 2023 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh, at Bilaspur, in CRA No. 34 of 2020 whereby the High Court continued the judgement and order of the Special Judge (SC/ST Court), Rajnandgaon, (CG) in Special Criminal (T) Case No. 10 of 2018, convicting and sentencing the appellant.

2.1 The appellant came to be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 450 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years with fine of ₹5,00/-. He was also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 [POCSO Act] and further came to be convicted for the offence under Section 376 (2), IPC to be sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and with a fine of ₹1,000/-. The punishment for the offence under Section 376 (2), IPC, which was more severe to one provided for the offence under the POCSO Act therefore the same came to be awarded.

5.5.7 In Wahid Khan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [(2010) 2 SCC 9], this Court repelled the contention of the appellant that since the hymen of the prosecutrix was found to be intact, it cannot be said that an offence of rape has been committed. The Court refuse to accept such contention in light of the definition of offence of rape in Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code. It was further observed that it is the consistent view of this Court that even the slightest penetration is sufficient to make out an offence of rape.

5.6 It is an opt-reiterated dictum of law that in cases of rape, the testimony of the prosecutrix alone may be sufficient and sole evidence of the victim, when cogent and consistent, could be properly used to arrive at a finding of the guilt. In the State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Manga Singh, (2019) 16 SCC 759, this Court in terms stated that conviction can be rested on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone.

The conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence. The conviction can be based solely on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the courts to insist for corroboration of her statement.

Corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law, but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor contractions or small discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing the evidence of the prosecutrix.” (Para 10) 5.6.1 It was further asserted that corroboration is not an essential requirement for conviction in the cases of rape.  It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence. As a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence. However, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence may not be available. In such cases, solitary testimony of the prosecutrix would be sufficient to base the conviction, if it inspires the confidence of the court.

(Para 11) 5.6.2 In Gurmit Singh (supra) it was observed to reiterate that in all cases, the corroboration to the statements made by the victim in her evidence could not be insisted upon as a rule of thumb:

In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook.

(Para 8) 5.6.3 It was asserted that only compelling reasons would justify rejection of testimony of a rape victim, and not otherwise:

“….the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury…..” (Para 8) 5.6.4 From a recent decision in Raju alias Umakant vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2025 SCC OnLine SC 997), following observations could be noticed:

“…….a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice but a victim of another person’s lust and it will be improper and undesirable to test her evidence with suspicion. All that the law mandates is that the Court should be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of charge levelled by her and if after keeping that aspect in mind if the Court is thereafter satisfied that the evidence is trustworthy, there is nothing that can stop the Court from acting on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. [See State of Rajasthan v. N.K. the Accused, (2000) 5 SCC 30, Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC 1213, State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewal Chand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550, State of Punjab v.

Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384]” (Para 18) 5.6.5 As early as in State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, [(1990) 1 SCC 550], this court observed that the prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with the accomplice, it was further observed that she is a victim of crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. It was further observed that evidence of a rape victim must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. It was stated that there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act which may require it to look for corroboration.

5.7 The last submission on behalf of the appellant that there were discrepancies in the evidences of victim (PW-2) and her brother (PW-11) has no room to stand, for, no material discrepancy could be noticed by the Court on comparison of the evidence of the two witnesses. Even otherwise, discrepancies in evidence which are of minor nature not going to the root have to be ignored. This Court observed in Lok Mal alias Loku (supra) that in criminal jurisprudence the principle is that the evidence of prosecutrix in case of rape is of the same value as that of an injured witness and conviction can be made on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, while reiterating this. 5.7.1 The sensitive approach and greater inclination to rely on the creditworthy evidence of the victim is guided by the aspect as observed in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai vs. State of Gujarat, [(1983) 3 SCC 217] it was observed thus:

In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion?”

(Para 9) 5.7.2 Insignificance of minor discrepancies was pointed out by this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Lekh Raj, [(2001) 1 SCC 247]. By referring to earlier judgment in Ousu Varghese vs. State of Kerala, [(1974) 3 SCC 767], it was observed that minor variation in the accounts of the witnesses are often the hallmark of the truth of their testimony and the discrepancies are found to be of minor character not going to the root of the prosecution story, they need not be given undue importance.

5.7.3 It was observed in Jagdish vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [(1981) SCC (Crl.) 676], that mere congruity or consistency is not the sole test of truth of depositions. The discrepancies have to be such which could be characterized as material, which are not normal and of the nature not expected from the normal person.

5.8 There is no gainsaying that the Court should remain sensitive while dealing with the charges of sexual assault on the helpless woman. In State of Rajasthan vs. N.K. The Accused, [(2000) 5 SCC 30], this Court observed that “an unmerited acquittal encourages wolves in the society being on the prowl for easy prey, more so when the victim of crime are helpless females.” Similar was expressed in Gurmit Singh (supra) that the rapist not only violates the victim’s privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. It was stated that the rape is not merely a physical assault and subsequently destructs the whole personality of the victim.

6. Evaluating the total evidence in light of the principles of law, evidentiary appreciation and application, with the evidence of the victim at the forefront, it has to be stated that victim’s evidence was entirely probable, natural and trustworthy who with lucidity narrated the whole incident about commission of offence against her by the accused. There exists no reason, much less compelling reasons, to disbelieve and discard her testimony. Her brother Mayank’s testimony as a child witness was rationally and logically supportive of what the prosecutrix narrated. The factum that the cot was in the porch and the victim was forced to lay there by the accused could also be called out from the evidence.

6.1 There was a consistency lent. The conduct of the victim, soon after the incident was quite natural, as she went to cousin sister’s neighbouring house and through her, informed cousin brother and her parents who were away.

6.2 The crux of the incident, of accused overpowering the victim and committing forcible act by forcing her to the bed, could be clearly established from the totality of evidence adduced by the prosecution. Merely because the medical evidence was less corroborative and less supportive or absent in details or indictive of no external injuries. It in no way weakened the prosecution case. Sole testimony of the victim was a strong evidence to rely on along with available attendant evidence.

6.3 The High Court was wholly justified in upholding and confirming the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant- convict, by the trial court.

7. The Criminal Appeal is accordingly dismissed.

………………………………….. J.

(SUDHANSHU DHULIA) ………………………………….. J.

(N.V. ANJARIA) NEW DELHI;

August 5, 2025